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One of the major challenges facing the American military
in the 1990 's is how to maintain a quality force under austere
conditions with reductions in defense spending. The following
passage from Weidenbaum's Small Wars, Big Defense, describes
this challenge:
The military establishment of the United States resembles
a heavily loaded, rapidly moving vehicle. The driver is
trying to reduce the speed substantially, but without
shaking up the passengers too badly and while keeping the
car on the right side of the road. As the driver slows
down, there are all sorts of noises in the engine. This
reminds the driver that the vehicle is overdue for repairs
and maintenance. [Ref. 1]
The end of the cold war has dramatically altered the
strategic balance of power between the United States, the
former Soviet Union, and other nations of the world. Recent
and significant events, such as the reunification of Germany
and formulation of the European Economic Community (EEC), have
also contributed to a tidal wave of change that is now
engulfing the world. A new military strategy is emerging
within the United States to reflect these changes. This
strategy is geared toward implementation by a smaller force.
At the same time, it demands that naval forces capability
remain high.
Maintaining a quality naval force under a reduced defense
budget will ultimately result in fewer ships and personnel in
the fleet. Training, maintenance support, and operating
procedures must be transformed to meet this challenge. In a
recent article in Naval Institute Proceedings
,
"Doing the Job
with a Smaller Fleet," Admiral Paul Miller, Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, addressed the issue of diminishing
resources as follows:
This creates a catalyst for change, bringing with it the
risks of innovation. No sweeping solutions exist, but
there are ways to whittle the problems down to size.
[Ref. 2]
New strategic initiatives are now being formulated in the
Navy in a concerted effort to maintain a quality force,
despite budget constraints, to keep pace with the changing
threat environment. These initiatives include standardizing
selected procedures between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets,
alternative naval force packages to satisfy requirements of
unified commanders, organizational restructuring and
streamlining, and creation of multimission capabilities for
optimal use of current assets. [Ref. 2]
This thesis focuses on the ship maintenance and repair
component of the overall challenge to the Navy to operate more
efficiently in the future. In the ship maintenance and repair
area, the phased maintenance concept, progressive maintenance
concept, and an engineered operating cycle are three new ship
maintenance strategies now being implemented in an effort to
improve efficiency. These concepts may ultimately be managed
under a single fleet-maintenance command (Afloat Maintenance
Command) [Ref . 2 ]
.
At issue is while operating under the umbrella of fiscal
constraint, these changes may also effect the availability of
adequate shore facilities and the continued use of mobile
maintenance platforms overseas. Maintenance capabilities
provided by shore activities and their relative proximity to
an assigned area of operation are factors which could affect
decision-makers in managing risk. The use of mobile
maintenance platforms as back-up could also heavily influence
maintenance and repair decisions, particularly when applying
the concept of conditional based maintenance. Political
ramifications stemming from a "wrong" decision and reluctance
to change the current system further complicate the practice
of performing maintenance based on actual material conditions.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to assess
innovative material readiness issues and the effects of
funding constraints on surface ship maintenance and repair
requirements overseas. A secondary objective of this research
effort is to examine some of the critical issues confronting
the Ship Maintenance and Repair Division of Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) and, in particular, the concept of condition
based maintenance. Finally, it is envisioned that this
assessment will provide additional insight to assist fleet
maintenance decision-makers in validating and justifying the
use of scarce resources.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In pursuit of these objectives, research is based on the
following four questions:
1. What are the critical requirements and funding issues
confronting maintenance resource facilities overseas?
2. What effect will new Navy maintenance strategies have
on planned requirements assigned to maintenance
facilities overseas?
3. Can Maintenance Requirement System (MRS) principles
be applied during periods of deployment to improve
material combat readiness?
4. How can the concept of conditional based maintenance
be reinforced through the use of mobile maintenance
platforms such as tender repair ships?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research data were collected by means of an extensive
literature search, and telephone and personal interviews.
Literary sources examined included published and unpublished
papers, periodicals, general reference texts, and existing
government publications. A complete list of literary sources
used is contained in the List of References.
Research was conducted in 4 major steps:
1. Interviews with Naval Sea Systems Command
Detachment, PERA (SURFACE); Naval Sea Svstems
Command (NAVSEA) ( SEA-915/935 ) ; Naval Ship Systems
Engineering Station (NAVSSES) (101); Appropriation
Matters Office (OP362); Commander Service Force
Sixth Fleet ( COMSERVFORSIXFLT) (60); and Naval
Regional Contracting Center, Naples, Italy.
2. Examination of overseas maintenance facility
organizations, strategy, capabilities,
accomplishments, and current trends in maintenance
reguirements by perusal of official documents,
supplemented by interviews.
3. Assessment of funding constraints on overseas shore
based maintenance facilities and justification for
the continued use of mobile maintenance platforms
(tenders )
.
4. Evaluation of MRS principles and the potential for
applying the concept of condition based maintenance
to afloat units during deployment.
The resulting research provides a consolidated insight on
actual reguirement trends and related funding issues including
deployed units in an overseas environment.
E. SCOPE OF STUDY
This study provides an overview of surface ship
maintenance and repair reguirements for deployed units.
Funding constraints are identified and assessed, including the
continued use of mobile maintenance platforms and performance
of unscheduled repairs. Justification for deployed repair
assets and flexibility in overseas maintenance and repair
contracting is also addressed.
The overview of requirements and funding aspects center on
the Sixth Fleet with a limited analysis of noted similarities
that may be applicable to the Pacific Fleet.
Finally, the principles supporting the Maintenance
Requirements System are addressed to include an assessment of
risk management criteria.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I has
outlined the objectives of the study in addition to providing
comment on both the scope of the study and research
methodology used.
Chapter II provides the background on innovative surface
ship maintenance and repair issues. Discussed are surface
ship maintenance strategies, ships employment cycle, and
innovative support tools to enhance decision-making based on
the concept of condition based maintenance.
Chapter III provides an overview of ships maintenance and
repair requirements overseas. Critical material requirements
and funding issues confronting both shore and mobile
maintenance platforms are identified.
Chapter IV provides an analysis of data collected from
research on critical issues concerning overseas resource
requirements.
Chapter V summarizes the results of the research, presents
conclusions, and provides recommendations for potential areas
of further research.
An appendix and a List of References are provided for
information and to facilitate further research in this area.
II. BACKGROUND ON INNOVATIVE SURFACE SHIP
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
Maintaining Navy ships' combat and engineering systems
fully capable and up-to-date results in placing ships off line
for periods of overhaul, repair, and modernization. With the
pace of technological development continuing to accelerate,
the time reguired for major ship maintenance must now be
reduced while increasing the percentage of the fleet available
for employment. [Ref. 2]
This chapter will address new strategic surface ship
maintenance and repair initiatives that are now being
implemented in a concerted effort to maintain a guality force,
despite impending budget constraints.
B. SHIP MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR STRATEGIES
Three innovative ship maintenance strategies have now been
implemented in an effort to enhance maximum operational
availability at the lowest practical cost and are based in
part on OPNAVINST 4700. 7H which states:
Class maintenance plans will be developed for each ship
class following the concepts of Reliability-Centered
Maintenance. A thorough knowledge and assessment of
actual equipment condition in relation to its designed
condition is the basis for maintenance decisions. Based
on knowledge of the material condition of the ship and
equipment, the Fleet Commander for his designated
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subordinates shall determine the maintenance actions
required. .. using Reliability-Centered Maintenance
principles to the maximum extent possible. [Ref. 3]
Ship class maintenance strategies are described in the
following subsections. [Ref. 3]
1. Phased Maintenance Concept
The phased maintenance program (PMP) applies to most
ships. With some exceptions, regular overhauls are
eliminated. The requirement for maintenance repair and
modernization is accomplished through a series of shorter
phased maintenance availabilities ( PMAs ) scheduled throughout
the employment cycle of each individual ship. The goals of
PMP are to maximize ship availability, improve operational
readiness, and upgrade material conditions.
Both repairs and modernization are included in the
PMAs. Ships are scheduled at 15 to 18 month intervals to
undergo PMAs, each averaging approximately three months in
duration. An assigned port engineer remains with the same
ship throughout its operating cycle, and is involved in the
planning, budgeting, authorizing, and execution of all
maintenance actions. Adherence to the principle of
reliability-centered maintenance is mandatory.
The phased maintenance concept emphasizes program
uniformity among the various ship classes and encompasses the
following criteria:
1. Base repair decisions on actual condition
assessment information.
2. Use qualified port engineers in the repair
definition process.
3. Ensure production contractor participation in
the advance planning process.
4. Have availabilities executed in ship homeports.
5. Provide flexibility to add or delete work during
availabilities
.
6. Preserve repair decision approval authority in
ship's commanding officers, Type Commander port
engineers, and Supervisors of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair.
2. Progressive Maintenance Concept
The progressive maintenance concept (PROG) applies
only to a small number of ships. The Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), in directing the acquisition of the FFG 7
(Guided Missile Frigate) and the PHM 1 (Patrol Combatant
Hydrofoil, Missile) classes of ship, imposed constraints in
the areas of cost (design-to-cost), displacement, and
shipboard manning. These constraints resulted in development
of the PROG strategy to compensate for reduced manpower by
minimizing organization level maintenance requirements while
also maintaining maximum operational availability.
The class employment cycle is based on a ten year
interval between major modernization and conversion overhauls.
Between these periods, maintenance is to be accomplished by
performing a discrete set of maintenance actions during
10
scheduled intermediate maintenance availabilities ( IMAVs ) and
selected restricted availabilities ( SRAs ) to optimize on-line
availability for the ships. Some ships homeported in forward
deployed areas have operational tempos that are most
effectively supported by the PROG concept and are to undergo
short availabilities by a ship repair facility (SRF).
Maintenance support for these ships is dependent upon
a change-out maintenance capability and capacity, and cycle
schedule discipline. The key to this concept is the ability
to conduct engineering analysis of installed equipment and
systems to determine their failure rates, related effects and
the extent of support required. The analysis provides the
basic core data in formulating the preventive maintenance
plan, estimating corrective maintenance requirements, and
establishing the level of repair (organizational, intermediate
or depot)
.
3 . Engineered Operating Cycle Program
The engineered operating cycle (EOC) establishes a
structured and engineered approach for maintaining aircraft
carriers, large amphibious ships, nuclear submarines, and
other complex classes. EOC programs define and implement a
specific maintenance class strategy with the primary goal of
sustaining combat readiness while increasing peacetime
operational availability at an acceptable cost.
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Because of complexity, these ships require closer
management of regular overhauls and combine required
maintenance with planned modernization at specific points in
each ship's life cycle.
Engineering analysis is the basis for defining and
scheduling maintenance to be performed during periods of
assigned availabilities. In a planned operating cycle, an
assessment of equipment (AEC) for specified systems and
equipment is performed by a performance monitoring team (PMT).
The AEC is normally accomplished 60-90 days before the start
of an SRA and again upon completion of the SRA to measure
designated system and equipment condition parameters. Repair
recommendations are then made based on actual conditions
encountered during each visit or subsequent technical analysis
for revision of the ship's class maintenance plan (CMP). The
CMP serves as the planning tool which prescribes the
fundamental life-cycle set of applicable intermediate and
depot level maintenance tasks needed to sustain material
readiness.
The EOC program has also expanded planning yard
responsibilities to improve design, material planning, and
coordination between the operating forces and systems
managers. Such is the case of the highly integrated Aegis
ships. The planning yard must now merge maintenance and
modernization planning and advance the application of
12
condition based vice time-based maintenance for all ship
systems. [Ref. 4]
C. EVOLUTIONARY EMPLOYMENT CYCLE
A new employment concept is now envisioned that will merge
the various maintenance improvement programs, previously
outlined in this chapter, into a standardized employment cycle
format. The cycle would consist of three functionally
distinct phases identified as refit, ready fleet, and
deployment. [Ref. 2]
Although the various maintenance and repair strategies are
tailored to a specific ship class, every unit would almost
always be operating in one of the three phases. Regular or
refueling overhauls would constitute a fourth phase, whenever
required.
Refit is the first phase, is approximately eight weeks in
duration, and begins after a ship returns from deployment.
During this phase, the unit will complete individual and team
training requirements as well as other basic training
milestones ashore. A refit unit will maintain a specified
minimum readiness level and undergo two maintenance
availability periods. The first and longest maintenance
availability, roughly equivalent to an SRA, will start shortly
after the beginning of the refit phase. The second
maintenance availability is shorter in duration, similar to an
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IMAV, and will be completed just prior to the end of the refit
phase.
Approximately six months before deployment and after
completion of all training, inspections, and maintenance
requirements, the ship will enter the ready fleet phase. As
a ready fleet asset, the unit will be under the operational
control of a separate fleet commander and will be available
for operations and exercises close the continental United
States. The unit will also maintain a higher level of
readiness and will be available for deployment within four to
ten days as part of a possible surge force. One and possibly
two phased-maintenance availabilities will be scheduled during
this period with the intent of enhancing the full level of
material readiness required for the impending deployment.
Deployment represents the final phase of the employment
cycle, averaging approximately six months in duration. This
phase begins on the day of departure from the unit's homeport
and ends on the day of return. At least one additional
maintenance availability will be performed during this period
to ensure that required material readiness is sustained.
Unless a ship has been scheduled for a regular or
refueling overhaul, the unit will again enter the refit phase
upon completion of deployment. Therefore, according to this
researcher, the employment cycle as currently envisioned
resembles that of a revolving employment cycle.
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D. INNOVATIVE TOOLS FOR MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT
Class maintenance plans (CMPs) are the heart of the Navy's
ship maintenance strategy. To translate these plans into
maintenance actions requires procedures for the assessment of
equipment condition, determination of material requirements,
and evaluation of actions taken.
As previously noted in Section B of this chapter, the CNO
has directed that CMPs be based on the concept of reliability-
centered maintenance. This requires a thorough knowledge and
assessment of actual equipment condition in relation to its
designed condition.
Equipment condition is a broad term that includes static
parameters such as size and shape, and dynamic parameters such
as speed, temperature, and pressure. Although ship's force is
in the best position to know the condition of the ship and
equipment, specialized assistance is often required to
determine the actual condition of much of the equipment. [Ref
.
3]
1. Assessment of Equipment Condition
In December 1988, the Assessment of Equipment
Condition (AEC) Office was established at Naval Ship Systems
Engineering Station (NAVSSES) to realign systems monitored to
reflect type and fleet commander priorities and to implement
the condition based maintenance strategy for all surface ship
classes. The primary thrust of this approach is to provide
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shipboard personnel with the necessary diagnostic tools and
techniques that would enhance condition based decision-making.
Ultimately, this could also permit the most cost effective
management of risk in Navy maintenance. Without condition
based information, maintenance decisions would continue to be
made on either timed or arbitrary insurance basis. [Ref. 5]
The AEC Program integrates condition based maintenance
into the work definition process with the use of performance
monitoring teams (PMTs) to conduct pre- and post depot level
availability ship visits to determine actual equipment
condition, and provide repair recommendations to availability
planners [Ref. 3].
Numerous initiatives to develop automated procedures
and diagnostics for condition based maintenance are also now
in progress. Computer based expert system prototypes,
designed to monitor and assess machinery condition through on
line sensors, are being installed on designated units
representing all major surface ship classes. Those prototypes
will monitor 30 ships systems identified as the most cost
burdensome to type commanders. The NAVSSES Condition Based
Maintenance Branch is supporting the evaluation of those
prototypes. [Ref. 5]
The evolution to reliability-centered maintenance
(condition based) appears to be underway. The end product, as
envisioned by NAVSSES, is a maintenance contingent
16
encompassing ships force, fleet level support activities ( PMTs
and RSGs), and the in-service engineering agents and life-
cycle managers. Ship's force preventive maintenance system
( PMS ) workload is intended to be greatly reduced, and major
repairs and overhauls will be based on actual eguipment
condition. [Ref. 5]
2. Measures of Effectiveness
A declining defense budget is a major factor which
will influence the way the United States Navy does business in
the future. The recent developments in surface ship
maintenance strategies, discussed in the previous sections of
this chapter, were implemented on the premise of achieving
reduced maintenance costs and improving the availability of
shipboard systems. Programs such as AEC will not be
accomplished without the expenditure of scarce resources.
Accurate measures of effectiveness (MOE) will be needed to
enhance cost effectiveness and justify expenditure of funds
[Ref. 6].
Ship maintenance is performed at the depot,
intermediate, and organizational levels. Depot level
maintenance refers to all maintenance activities performed in
public and private shipyards. The work is performed by
civilian employees. Intermediate maintenance is performed by
Navy enlisted personnel at a shore intermediate maintenance
activity (SIMA) or a tender (mobile maintenance platform).
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Organizational level maintenance is that work performed by the
ship's force. To obtain an adequate representation of
maintenance costs, all three levels of maintenance must be
accessed and tracked at the fleet, class, ship, and equipment
levels. [Ref. 3 and 6]
In the recent article in Naval Engineers Journal,
"Measures of Effectiveness as Applied to Maintenance Periods,"
Elfont and Procaccino contend that data sources to support MOE
are already in place via other programs. Depot level cost
data can be obtained by access to the Planning and Engineering
for Repairs and Alterations (PERA) corporate data base. This
database contains cost data from completed and authorized Ship
Alteration and Repair Packages (SARPs). The data are stored
and accessible by fleet, class, hull, Ship Work Authorization
Boundary (SWAB), and Ship Work Line Item Number (SWLIN) for
various types of depot level availabilities. NAVSSES
presently houses and maintains a database which contains depot
level cost data for Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E)
systems. These data can be used in conjunction with
intermediate and organizational level cost data extracted from
the Maintenance Data System ( 3M system), via the NAVSSES Ships
Machinery Analysis and Research Technique (SMART) system.
Data from this source already have been used in the system
selection process for the AEC Program. [Ref. 6]
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The above data will be used to establish cost trends
for each ship class and hull. These trend analyses will show
which systems have been most positively affected by AEC
monitoring and will identify the systems that are not
performing as planned. In addition, these data will be used
to trend and compare the 30 selected AEC systems for a given
class or hull versus other systems not covered by the AEC
Program. [Ref. 6]
The Visibility and Management of Operating and Support
Costs (VAMOSC) database is another information source that
will be used to monitor the extent of effectiveness of the AEC
Program on a higher level. This database tracks operating and
support (O&S) costs at the ship level for all active fleet
ships. These data will be used for cost trend comparison of
a group of individual systems versus total direct depot or
intermediate maintenance costs. [Ref. 6]
Cost is not the only factor which should be considered
when assessing the effectiveness of a particular maintenance
practice. The perceived benefit of condition based
maintenance is a reduction in cost, but availability or
operational readiness cannot be sacrificed for the sake of
cost. Operational availability is the availability of a
system to perform its function at any point in time that it is
reguired to do so. This represents the actual availability of
the system and considers all eguipment down time, including
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repair time logistical delays. The required data to assess
this availability can be extracted from the Maintenance Data
System (MDS) and casualty report (CASREP) systems via the
SMART system located at NAVSSES. [Ref. 6]
Finally, Elfont and Procaccino conclude that MOE has
the potential to be an effective and cost efficient method for
gaging and improving the effectiveness of condition based
maintenance. MOE will provide a valuable tool to maintenance
managers at the organizational, intermediate, and depot levels
of maintenance, to identify and correct problems associated
with their equipment and maintenance strategy. [Ref. 6]
E. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM
1. Purpose
The Surface Ship Maintenance and Repair Division of
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has been tasked to develop
a process for surface ship maintenance budget preparation and
justification that will identify projected funding
requirements, and assess the impact of potential funding
shortfalls below requested levels [Ref. 7],
This task was supported in part by Department of
Defense Directive 5000.39 which states that adequate funding
be included in budget requests to meet system readiness
objectives and identify the readiness impact of failing to
provide requested funding. Department of Defense Directive
5000.39 was replaced by Part 7, Section A of Department of
20
Defense Instruction 5000.2 on 23 February 1991. Section A
establishes Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) acquisition
policy to ensure that support considerations are effectively
integrated into system design, and that required support
structure elements are acquired concurrently with each new
system. This will enable a system to be both supportable and
supported (funded) when fielded.
Furthermore, ILS planning must be focused at the level
at which support resources must be integrated to affect
maintenance. This is the level at which specific repair or
maintenance will occur, and is usually at the subsystem level
or below. [Ref . 8
]
2. Basic Structure
In response to this task, the Maintenance Requirements
System (MRS) concept was developed by NAVSEA based on three
separate but interrelated processes [Ref. 9]:
1. Define the requirements. Determine the
maintenance required to be performed during an
availability to ensure the safe and reliable
operation of the ship during its follow-on
operating cycle.
2. Project the requirements to support budgeting.
Intelligently project those requirements over
the POM years to ensure adequate funding is
programmed to execute those requirements.
3
.
Manage risk in a constrained funding
environment. If unable to program to the
required level, identify the potential impacts
of funding to a lower level and articulate the
impact on the Navy's ability to carry out its
assigned mission.
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The first process of defining requirements is the
foundation upon which MRS is based. Maintenance requirements
are defined by way of the availability planning process. The
strength of this process is that it identifies real
maintenance requirements for a particular ship during a
specific maintenance availability, based on both validated
time directed maintenance requirements and the actual
condition of the ship as determined during the maintenance
planning process.
Completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of feedback is
mandatory to facilitate continued improvement of the MRS
process. This includes feeding useful information into the
various maintenance databases, providing ready access to all
participants who need the information, and centralizing the
process by interfacing existing databases.
The maintenance and repair requirement definition
process provides the information upon which subsequent MRS
steps are based. The output from projecting requirements to
support budgeting and the management of risk will only be as
good as the input provided by the process that defines the
requirements
.
3 . Risk Management Theory
Operating in a constrained funding environment may
ultimately result in providing adequate support to less ships
or, at the other extreme, providing inadequate support to a
22
greater number of ships with a deteriorating capability in
material and manpower readiness. The ability to meet national
security objectives must be supported by balancing force
structure and force readiness. A process tool is needed for
type commanders, fleet commanders, and OPNAV to manage the
risk associated with reduced maintenance funding.
NAVSEA is currently developing this process by
defining risk at the maintenance work item level using the
following basic formula [Ref. 9]:
RISK = SEVERITY X PROBABILITY
where:
Severity = the significance of an outcome based
on safety and system mission importance,
and:
Probability = the likelihood of an outcome where the
system will be inoperative if not maintained.
The relative risk is the risk associated with each maintenance
work item within an availability where the systems will fail
during the next operating period if the work item is not
performed.
Risk is then analyzed for each work item scheduled for
a specific availability. Upon sorting work items in
descending order of risk, an assessment can be made using
23
sensitivity analysis to simulate the impact of various funding
constraints and also some possible mission effects.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has addressed some of the innovative concepts
and programs that are now being implemented in response to
critical surface ship maintenance and repair issues. These
concepts and programs have evolved under the premise of
continued fiscal constraint, reguiring that the Navy uphold
interests of national security with a smaller fleet.
The maintenance and repair strategies of PMP, PROG, and
EOC all enhance the concept of condition based maintenance and
standardization of class maintenance plans. Innovative tools
for maintenance management such as AEC and MOE reinforce the
concept of condition based maintenance and examine its
effectiveness. The evolving or revolving employment cycle
will further standardize ship class utilization throughout
respective operating cycles.
Finally, the MRS concept provides a valuable tool in
planning, budgeting, and assessment to minimize the impact of
fiscal constraint, and to improve efficiency in decision
making.
The next chapter provides an overview of surface ship
maintenance and repair requirements overseas.
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III. OVERVIEW OF SURFACE SHIP MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIR ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of overseas surface ship
maintenance and repair requirements, focusing on the regional
areas of Western Asia and the Mediterranean Sea. There are
two reasons for this approach. First, during the period from
April 1990 to July 1991, areas within the Arabian Gulf, North
Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean Sea were
witness to the largest deployment of United States naval
forces since the Second World War. This rapid buildup
presented overseas based maintenance managers with a multitude
of surface ship maintenance challenges.
Secondly, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm,
and Operation Provide Comfort all employed naval forces in
response to regional conflict. In the January 1992 document,
The National Military Strategy of the United States, General
Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
addressed the need for regional focus:
Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the
threats we expect to face are regional rather than global.
The growing complexity of the international security
environment makes it increasingly difficult to predict the
circumstances under which US military power might be
employed. Hence, forward presence and crisis response are
fundamental to our regionally oriented strategy. [Ref . 10]
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If the security interests of the United States require a
shift from global to regional strategy, the United States
Navy must be prepared to support deployed surface ships in
remote geographical locations such as the Arabian Gulf and
Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
B. MEDITERRANEAN MAINTENANCE STRUCTURE
1. Organizational Responsibilities
Commander, Service Force Sixth Fleet
(COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT) , a component of the United States Sixth
Fleet, is located in Naples, Italy. COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT is
responsible for maintenance and repair support for all ships
of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, all
United States navy ships operating in the eastern Atlantic
Ocean off the west coast of Africa and Northern Europe, and
all Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command
( COMUSNAVCENT ) ships operating in the Red Sea. [Ref. 11]
For purposes of command and control, the Sixth Fleet
organization located in Naples, Italy is comprised of the
following three functional support components:
1. Commander, Service Force Sixth Fleet provides
overall surface ship maintenance and logistics
support
.
2. Commander, Task Force Six-Three provides
underway replenishment and at-sea support
requirements.
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3. Commander, Naval Force Group Mediterranean
provides overall administrative support
requirements.
All three organizational components are managed and
administered under a single staff. Four organizational
elements directly support surface ship maintenance and repair.
[Ref. 11]
a. Comptroller Unit
The Comptroller Unit, located at Naples, Italy, is
staffed with four civil service employees. The Comptroller
Unit is responsible for management and fiscal accountability
of the COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT maintenance budget.
The COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT maintenance budget is
supported from several pots of money such as CINCLANTFLT
Technical Operating Budget, CINCPACFLT 2275 Funding Document,
CINCLANTFLT Muse open ended allotment, CINCUSNAVEUR Operating
Budget, and the COMNAVSURFLANT Operating Target (OPTAR). In
addition, all Pacific Fleet Mideast commercial maintenance
funding is managed directly by the COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT
Comptroller in Naples, Italy.
Jb. Ship Repair Unit
The Ship Repair Unit (SRU), an industrial
maintenance activity located at Naples, Italy, is staffed with
two military officers and 18 civil service employees, most of
which are ship surveyors. The SRU is responsible for planning
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and overseeing all commercial industrial hull, mechanical, and
electrical (HM&E) voyage repairs on surface ships.
The bulk of COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT maintenance funds
are managed through the SRU. In compliance with Section
7309(c) of Title 10, United States Code, the SRU charter
permits accomplishment of voyage repairs though not the
overhaul of ships based (homeported) in the continental United
States (CONUS). Section 7309(c) of this legislation prohibits
ships homeported in the United States from being overhauled,
repaired, or maintained overseas except for voyage repairs.
c. Mobile Technical Unit Six
Mobile Technical Unit Six (MOTU SIX) is closely
associated with SRU and is staffed with one military officer
and 35 military and civilian technicians. MOTU SIX
technicians provide on-the-job training and responsive (upon
request) technical assistance to afloat units for repair,
maintenance, and operation of electronics, communications, and
weapons systems.
d. SRU Detachment Bahrain
SRU Detachment Bahrain serves as a forward on-site
SRU coordinator and is staffed with ships surveyors, HM&E
technicians, and combat systems technicians. During Operation
Desert Storm, COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT was temporarily augmented by
67 additional personnel, 54 of which were assigned to SRU
Detachment Bahrain.
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2. Surface Ship Maintenance and Repair Policy
Surface ship maintenance for deployed and overseas
homeported ships is provided based on the following
priorities: [Ref. 12]
1. Emergent maintenance involving C-3 and C-4
CASREPS.
2. Emergent maintenance involving C-2 CASREPS.
3. Planned maintenance availabilities.
4. Continuous Ship-to-Shop availability.
5. Periodic inspection reguirements.
Emergent repairs, conducted in remote locations away
from industrial facilities to correct CASREPS, are
accomplished by the use of repair Fly-Away-Teams (FATs) or
Tiger Teams from either a deployed tender or shore based
repair activity. These teams are transported to the affected
unit by surface craft or helicopter and provide skills,
eguipment, and technical expertise necessary to augment ship's
force in correcting the casualty.
In addition to local (in theater) teams, Technical
Assistance and Tiger Team FATs from CONUS can be used for high
interest and major casualty repairs. The use of CONUS teams
is far more expensive compared to local teams and is normally
viewed by responsible maintenance managers as a final and last
resort alternative for this reason.
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Continuous Ship-to-Shop availability, between the
tender repair department and the supported unit, is the
maintenance and repair of equipment based on individual and
independent repair actions. An individual piece of equipment
or gear is removed from the respective ship's system,
packaged, and shipped through the Navy transportation system
to a nearby Mediterranean tender or shore based repair
facility. The equipment is then repaired by the repair
activity and returned via the transportation system to the
supported unit.
Planned maintenance and repair for deployed units
varies depending on length of deployment and type of
availability required. Typically, one formal, uninterrupted
two-week availability (IMAV) may be scheduled alongside a
tender or one two-week restricted availability (RAV) may be
scheduled at a shipyard for the first three months of a
deployment. Additional periods are scheduled when feasible
based on five days of IMAV or RAV time for each additional
month of deployment. Fourteen days might also be scheduled
for ship's force upkeep during the first three months of
deployment, with an allotted five days of upkeep for each
additional month of deployment.
Final planning of depot level maintenance periods
(RAVs) is generally accomplished based on the following pre-
availability time sequence: [Ref. 12]
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A-45 days Ship's work package is submitted to SRU.
A-35 days Work package is screened by the typedesk.
A-30 days Work package undergoes surveyor review.
A-21 days Surveyors conduct ship check.
A- 18 days Surveyors write reguirement
specifications
.
A-07 days Funding reguirement s are estimated and
justified.
A-00 days Supported ship arrives. Prospective
contractors initiate ship check.
A+01 days Repair contract is awarded. Contractor
orders non government furnished material.
RAV commences on jobs ready for work.
Capabilities of the various shipyard and commercial
contractors vary throughout the Mediterranean region and
generally accomplish only merchant ship type repairs. Repair
of optical systems, electronics, and combat systems are
scheduled to be done by tenders.
Final planning of IMAVs is relatively simple. A
current Mediterranean Work Package (MWP) for the supported
unit is held on-board the tender assigned to perform the
availability. Approximately 30 days prior to the scheduled
IMAV, the supported unit sends the tender a message listing of
all work that the ship commanding officer desires to have
accomplished. If feasible, a team from the tender will ship
check the work package approximately two weeks before the
start of the IMAV. Upon identifying the actual jobs to be
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worked, final preparations are made in an effort to start as
many work items as possible on the first day of the
availability.
3. Comparative Overview of Requirements
During fiscal year 1991, maintenance managers in the
Mediterranean conducted over 38.4 million dollars worth of
scheduled and emergent commercial maintenance. The scope of
this effort included quick response emergent work and multiple
( both planned and no-notice) maintenance availabilities on
160 surface ships of the Sixth Fleet and United States Naval
Forces Central Command, spanning 30 different ports in 13
different countries. A total of 129 commercial availabilities
(RAVs) and 61 Mediterranean and Red Sea tender IMAVs (four
repair ships) were conducted during this period. An
additional 188 USNAVCENT IMAVs were accomplished by six repair
tenders independent of COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT. These scheduled
maintenance availabilities greatly enhanced fleet operational
readiness. [Ref. 11]
In comparison, during fiscal year 1990, maintenance
managers in the Mediterranean conducted over 13.5 million
dollars worth of scheduled and emergent maintenance
encompassing over 60 different ships in 17 different ports and
ten different countries. There were 60 commercial RAVs
conducted and 62 IMAVs with three repair ships deployed to the
Sixth Fleet. [Ref. 11]
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The above comparison demonstrates the broad range of
support that overseas maintenance managers must provide during
times of regional crisis.
C. MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT INITIATIVES
The scope of effort addressed in the preceding subsection
of this chapter describes unique challenges in the planning
and conduct of surface ship maintenance. Identification of
new industrial bases, pre-positioning of selected support
assets, and repair ship utilization are instrumental in
sustaining high material readiness of the deployed fleet.
These support initiatives are described in the following
subsections. [Ref. 11]
1. Commercial Industrial Base Availability
An important aspect of ship maintenance policy-
overseas has been the identification and development of new or
seldom used industrial bases (ports) to perform scheduled
maintenance and emergent repairs. Industrial bases play a
strategic role in support of contingency operations and can
directly contribute to fleet operational readiness.
To support a continuous amphibious presence in the
North Arabian Sea during operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, a ship maintenance base was established in the United
Arab Emirates. A temporary ship surveyor branch office
(COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT SRU DET DUBAI) was opened in Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, to manage surface ship maintenance
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availabilities. The use of drydocks was significantly
expanded enabling individual amphibious task force units to be
rotated through the maintenance facility at Dubai for ten-day
maintenance availability periods, starting every seven days.
Operating from October 1990 until the facility closed in July
1991, the SRU detachment at Dubai managed 38 restricted
availabilities (RAVs) during the nine month period - a benefit
derived from a strategy of forward basing.
In April 1991, immediately following Operation Desert
Storm, the presence of United States naval forces was required
off the coast of Turkey to support ground troops providing
assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq (Operation Provide
Comfort). This operation tethered the Mediterranean Marine
Amphibious Readiness Group (MARG) to Turkish ports in support
of United States Marines ashore. The only available
commercial maintenance facility capable of providing
maintenance to deployed units in the Eastern Mediterranean was
based at Haifa, Israel. As the situation stabilized in
Northern Iraq, individual amphibious units were allowed to
proceed (one at a time) to Haifa, Israel for scheduled
maintenance. Meanwhile, alternative commercial ship repair
sites were surveyed in Greece, Egypt, and Turkey.
A problem of how to maintain three warships assigned
to the Maritime Interdiction Force emerged when the last
aircraft carrier battle group departed the Red Sea in 1991.
34
^The three ships had little onboard industrial capability and
were mostly powered by single propulsion plants. Operational
requirements also dictated that these units remain close to
the North Red Sea. Local commercial contractor support was
not available. A consensus maintenance plan was adopted
between COMUSNAVCEN and COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT that exchanged
Maritime Interdiction Force Units from the Red Sea to the
Eastern Mediterranean to conduct planned maintenance.
Strategic positioning of mobile maintenance platforms
(tenders) adjacent to fleet operations is essential for
material readiness support. New tender safe havens
(permission by host government to moor pierside or anchor in
port and conduct maintenance operations) have been established
in the following areas:
1. NATO pier at Souda Bay, Crete.
2. NATO pier at Agusta Bay, Italy.
3. Turkish Navy pier at Aksaz , Turkey.
4. Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates.
5. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
6. Safaga, Egypt.
7. Hurgada, Egypt.
2. Surface Tender Utilization
Tenders stationed in the Arabian Gulf and North
Arabian Sea (six repair ships) operated under specific task
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force commanders. CASREP tasking was initially coordinated
jointly between COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT and COMLOGSUPPFORSEVENTHFLT
(Commander, Logistic Support Force Seventh Fleet). In
February 1991, COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT SRU Detachment Bahrain
assumed sole responsibility of coordinating the source of
CASREP assistance. The deployed COMUSNAVCENT tender was the
primary source of this assistance.
USS YELLOWSTONE (AD-41) was positioned at safe haven
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to provide longer IMAVs and
coordinate Red Sea Repair efforts. In February 1991, USS
PUDGET SOUND (AD-38) relieved USS YELLOWSTONE in Jeddah.
During her subsequent westward transit of the Mediterranean
Sea to CONUS, USS YELLOWSTONE provided much-needed radiac
(radiological calibration equipment) support services to units
in the Eastern Mediterranean and at Souda Bay, Crete (radiac
equipment cannot be transported across foreign soil).
USS VULCAN (AR-5) was placed at safe haven in Hurgada,
Egypt, in closer proximity to carrier battle groups and
Maritime Interdiction Force units. From this position, the
tender provided rapid, short-notice voyage repairs, Fly-Away-
Teams, and easy access for Ship-to-Shop availability work.
Upon departure of one Red Sea carrier battle group to the
North Arabian Sea, USS VULCAN was repositioned to safe haven
at Souda Bay, Crete, and supported afloat units on station in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
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As previously noted in subsection C.l. of this
chapter, surface ships were periodically exchanged between the
Mediterranean and Red Seas. This technique enhanced
operational readiness by providing commercial restricted
availability periods, tender intermediate maintenance
availabilities, and enabled both Mediterranean and Red Sea
units to be supported under a single maintenance plan.
3. Pre-positioning of Support Equipment
In 1990, as the tempo of naval operations increased in
Southwest Asia, a strategy of pre-positioning was used to
place contingency assets at remote locations to support
emergent repairs. Gas turbine engines with generator
changeout vans and spare engines were pre-positioned in
Bahrain, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Sigonella, Italy. This
initiative ultimately resulted in on-station replacement of
four gas turbine generators, five gas generators, and four
power turbines. [Ref. 11]
In addition to establishing a forward base, equipment
pre-staged at Bahrain included battle damage repair vans,
water jet machines, lube oil flushing rigs, and emergency ship
salvage materials. [Ref. 11]
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D. MAINTENANCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
With COMNAVSURFLANT assistance, Maintenance Resource
Management Systems (MRMS) were installed by NAVSEA at two
sites in Naples, Italy, and at Bahrain. MRMS is a
computerized system that is gradually being introduced to the
fleet and is being installed at CONUS Readiness Support Groups
(RSGs), Shore Intermediate Maintenance Facilities (SIMAs),
Supervisors of Ship Building and Repair (SUPSHIPs), and tender
repair ships.
1. System Background
MRMS is a computerized system that provides the Type
Commander with an automated method of maintaining the force-
wide CSMP. The system was developed to support the management
of ship maintenance by enabling more effective management of
maintenance assets and improving the response to maintenance
deferrals originated by ships. Development of MRMS is
consistent with long-term Ship's Non-tactical Automated Data
Processing System (SNAP I, II), Type Commander's Headquarters
Automated Information System (THAIS), and Intermediate
Maintenance Management System-Real Time ( IMMS RT) . MRMS
interfaces with other data processing systems which link the
Navy's historical data files, shipboard maintenance projects,
and both intermediate and depot-level repair facilities. The
system serves as a CSMP holder ashore for automated ships and
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maintains primary automated CSMP files for non-automated ships
assigned to the system. [Ref. 13]
TYCOM maintenance personnel receive work requests from
ships, update CSMP files, revise availability files, and
screen job work items to repair activities within 96 hours
from time of initial receipt of transmission from the fleet.
MRMS is designed to provide the following basic services to
system users [Ref. 14]:
1. Generate individual or bulk automated work
requests (AWRs).
2. Produce CSMP IB summary hard copy report or
naval message tape.
3. Produce CSMP Report 2 (full narrative), CSMP
Report 1C for the Board of Inspection and
Survey (INSURV), and CSMP Report ID (safety
summary)
.
4. Transfer CSMP data via AUTODIN, modem, 9-track
magnetic tapes, or floppy disk.
5. Load standard Maintenance Data System (MDS)
data.




Produce Type Commander Work Package Tracking
(TWPT) reports.
8. Update MDS files at Navy Maintenance Support
Offices (NAMSO).
9. Produce complete package or multipart OPNAV
4790/2Q reports for each unit, as requested,
immediately prior to INSURV inspection.
10. Load Master Job Catalog (MJC) work items to a
specific CSMP for non-automated units.
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11. Load standard MDS data from communication
station produced tapes containing consolidated
Ship Maintenance Action Form (SMAF) inputs.
12. Accept calldown message tapes and automatically
transfer Job Sequence Numbers (JCNs) from CSMP
to an availability file.
13. Load INSURV, Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection
(POT&I), and Repair Maintenance Management
System Class Maintenance Plan (RMMS CMP) items
to individual CSMP accounts via RMMS or naval
message tapes for non-automated units.
14. Screen, review, and modify deferrals on line for
non-automated ships.
15. Screen incoming data for critical data elements
and errors, and produce error summary reports.
2. Overseas Adaptation
MRMS service needs by overseas maintenance managers
are distinct from, and often combine several of, the basic
system designed services. Several new and adapted programs
are being written in 1992 with COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT assistance
[Ref. 11]:
Financial Tracking Module - Provides a faster
method in tracking maintenance funds to enhance
financial accountability. Program design will
track a job from ship surveyors original
government estimate through contract award and
any subsequent revisions to final close out or
termination of the contract. Naval Regional
Contracting Center Naples, Italy, is assisting
in program development.
Work Specification Module - Provides work
specification commonality throughout
COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT SRUs to monitor the quality
of foreign contractor repairs (an adaptation
from the SUPSHIP function). The module is
40
now in operation at SRU Naples, Italy, and
Bahrain.
3. Contractor Port Facility Module - Provides key
data on Master Ship Repair Agreement (MSRA)
contractors and on facilities in foreign ports
where repairs are conducted.
4. Technical Representative Tracking Module -
Provides an active data base to track all
CONUS, MOTU-SIX, and tender technical personnel
currently traveling in theater. The program
will assist in diverting technical




Work Tracking Module - Provides near real time
tracking of tender and SRU repair work (an
adaptation from the RSG function). This module
will also enable data exchange via Streamlined
Alternative Logistics Transmissions (SALTS) to
tenders and CONUS RSGs as reguired.
6 CASREP Tracking Module - Provides Type Desk
officers a more responsive paperless CASREP
tracking system which is integrated with the
logistic (repair parts) CASREP tracking system
(an adaptation from the prototype THAIS
module). The key advantage is the ability to
read CASREP messages from a computer disc
directly into the data base.
7. Eguipment Tracking Module - Provides
maintenance managers the ability to track pre-
positioned eguipment at remote staging sites
and on deployed tenders.
8. Scheduling Module - Provides automated




Technical Data Link - Provides connectivity
with CONUS SUPSHIP and SIMA data bases, and the
Planning and Estimating for Repair and
Alteration (PERA) test document data base




10. Historical Maintenance Availability Data Base -
Provides historical data on foreign port usage
and tender utilization.
E. STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES
The lessons learned from recent conflict in the Middle
East and Southwest Asia provides valuable insight for
maintaining fleet readiness during times of regional crisis.
The capability to sustain material readiness must now be
maintained despite impending budget constraints.
This section addresses key strategic issues now
confronting surface ship maintenance managers in the
Mediterranean area of operations [Ref. 15].
1 . Quality Maintenance Time
To remain at peak operational effectiveness, ships
require quality maintenance time for both self maintenance and
outside assistance. The current agreement between
CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCLANTFLT provides 14 uninterrupted days of
RAV or IMAV, 14 uninterrupted days of ship's force upkeep for
the first quarter deployed, and 5 days each per month prorated
throughout the remainder of deployment. These periods cannot
run concurrently.
The value of ship's crew self maintenance and liberty can
not be measured merely in dollars alone. These priorities
must be balanced against adhering to planned maintenance
committments as well as operational exercises.
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2.
Conduct Repairs in Theater
Experience from Operation Desert Shield and Operation
Desert Storm has shown that it is rarely prudent to defer
mission essential repairs to CONUS . Every deployed ship
should be maintained fully mission capable by putting a
minimum reliance on emergent repairs. The practice of
deferring maintenance in CONUS prior to deployment further
complicates the task of maintaining material readiness when
maintenance deferred equipment fails in theater. For logistic
considerations, all maintenance availabilities in theater
should be accomplished at or near an airhead to minimize
material shipment leadtime.
3 . Mobile Maintenance Platforms
It is strategically important for the United States
Navy to maintain surface tender capability in the
Mediterranean theater of operations if activities in this area
are likely to continue to pose a threat to United States and
allied interests. Repair ships represent a flexible
industrial base that provide mobile repair capacity and
technical expertise which are crucial for maintaining naval
forces in any forward deployed or potentially hostile
environment.
In 1990, during Operation Sharp Edge, Fly-Away-Teams
comprised of Mediterranean tender technicians were placed
onboard amphibious ships remotely located in the Eastern
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Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Africa. The technical
capability provided by these teams greatly enhanced the repair
capability by own ship's force.
Between 1990 and 1991, over 500 technical assist
visits, many by multiple tender technical experts, were
conducted in support of ship CASREPS in the Eastern Atlantic
Ocean, North Arabian Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and
Arabian Gulf [Ref. 11].
Foreign, shore-based commercial maintenance facilities
and contractors are restricted primarily to major non-nuclear
and unclassified (for reasons of technological security) Hull,
Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) work packages. Nuclear,
electronic, combat systems, and calibration capability is
limited to assets organic to the United States Navy; deployed
tenders are the most cost effective source asset for support.
4. Fiscal Accountability
As addressed in subsection B.l.a. of this chapter, the
Mediterranean maintenance budget (approximately $50 million in
FY 91) is supported from several different sources.
Individual cost elements derived from a ship's repair work
package such as material costs, labor manhour rates, utility
costs, Ship Repair Unit and Naval Regional Contracting Center
labor costs, or pierside support costs are not all funded from
the same source. Ultimately, commands making decisions that
impact upon maintenance costs are not accountable for the
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funds they cause to be expended. Type commanders have direct
control over repair funds ana indirect, control of the repair
process [Ref. 16]. Operational schedules have traditionally
commanded a higher priority over maintenance schedules and




This chapter has addressed surface ship maintenance and
repair requirements in an overseas environment where, in 1992,
the largest number of United States naval forces since the
Second World War were employed. During a 15 month period,
maintenance managers based in the Mediterranean theater
provided maintenance on fully one-third of the Navy's surface
ships. Maintenance initiatives taken by maintenance managers
to support this mammoth task demonstrate the importance of
timing, positioning, and flexibility.
Regardless of operational tempo, overseas maintenance
managers have two basic industrial bases to draw from: shore
based industrial facilities and mobile maintenance platforms.
Each source has its advantages and disadvantages, but both are
required if optimal material readiness is to be efficiently
maintained for Navy ships.
The Maintenance Resource Management System promises to
provide overseas maintenance managers a valuable tool in
planning, tracking, and assessment of surface ship maintenance
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actions, including fiscal accounting of resources expended.
Overseas maintenance managers are confronted with surface
ship maintenance and repair problems that often are difficult
to control. Examples include quality maintenance time and
assuring accountability for maintenance costs incurred caused
by operational decision-makers.
Finally, surface tenders are strategically crucial in
maintaining a deployed naval force. Repair ships provide the
overseas maintenance manager a mobile maintenance capability
that shore-based maintenance activities cannot inherently
provide. As Admiral Miller stated, "We must learn to use our
assets smarter. With a smaller fleet, there will be fewer
units positioned forward. Those forces must be able to
respond to crises in any theater. " [Ref. 2]
The next chapter provides an evaluation of research
findings on critical issues related to overseas resource
requirements.
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IV. EVALUATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ON SURFACE SHIP
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters have addressed the need to
assess material readiness issues and the effects of funding
constraints on surface ship maintenance and requirements
overseas, identified current innovative surface ship
maintenance and repair issues, and provided an overview of
surface ship maintenance requirements in maintaining material
readiness of forward deployed naval forces. With this
foundation, it is now possible to examine the underlying
issues concerning overseas resource requirements.
An assessment of alternative source maintenance costs, the
underlying issues confronting overseas maintenance and repair
contracting, and the effects of current and projected funding
constraints are presented.
Because of vast geographical distances to source
locations, information for this analysis was gathered
primarily through telephone interviews and substantiated with
subsequent documentation received from each respective source.
Interviews were conducted with both junior and senior
government personnel including budgeting analysts, ship-type
planners and requirements programmers, contracting officers in
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ship repair, and maintenance managers responsible for
provision of surface ship maintenance and repair overseas.
B. CURRENT TRENDS IN SURFACE SHIP MAINTENANCE
1. Mobile Maintenance Platforms
The Navy surface force has witnessed a dramatic
reduction in repair ship assets within the past three years.
A listing of commissioned surface repair ships available in
1989 and in 1992 are shown in Table 1 to illustrate this trend
[Ref. 16].
TABLE 1: COMMISSIONED SURFACE REPAIR SHIPS
Surface Repair Ship
1989
S urface Repair Ship
1992
AD-15 USS PRAIRE AD-18 USS SIERRA
AD-18 USS SIERRA AD-19 USS YOSEMITE
AD-19 USS YOSEMITE AD-37 USS SAMUAL GOMPERS
AD-37 USS SAMUAL GOMPERS AD-38 USS PUDGET SOUND
AD-38 USS PUDGET SOUND AD-41 USS YELLOWSTONE
AD-41 USS YELLOWSTONE AD-42 USS ACADIA
AD-42 USS ACADIA AD-43 USS CAPE COD
AD-43 USS CAPE COD AD-44 USS SHENANDOAH






Within the next two years, it is possible that three
additional repair vessels will be decommissioned leaving a
balance of six surface repair ships available for employment
by 1995. Of the six remaining vessels, three would be
available to support operations in the Atlantic theater and
three would be available to support operations in the Pacific
theater. Table 2 illustrates surface repair ship availability
based on the additional reduction of three ships [Ref. 16].





AD-38 USS PUDGET SOUND AD-3 7 USS SAMUAL GOMPERS
AD-41 USS YELLOWSTONE AD-42 USS ACADIA
AD-44 USS SHENANDOAH AD-43 USS CAPE COD
Interviewees from both TYCOM offices ( COMNAVSURFPAC and
COMNAVSURFLANT ) indicated concern over the age of the repair
platforms. The repair platforms shown in Table 2 will range
in age from 35 to 40 years by the year 2000.
There are no current plans to replace these platforms
through new construction. A previous proposal for
construction of the ARX (auxiliary repair platform) was
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previously disapproved. Interviewees indicated that the
proposed platform was controversial because it consolidated
most auxiliary ship type requirements creating a universal or
common ship which could support all ship types and major
classes. Included in the configuration was a repair part load
list and storage of large pre-fabricated plates for each major
class of ship. As one interviewee stated, "It would of taken
a platform the size of two aircraft carriers just to carry all
that." The ARX also faced stiff competition in obtaining the
required funding. New construction of surface ship combatants
commands a much higher priority than auxiliary support ships.
Based on the consensus of those interviewed, the ARX project
is now a dead issue.
2 . Surface Ship Maintenance and Repair Funding
Interviews with TYCOM planning offices reveled that
scheduled RATA (restricted availability/technical
availability) requirements in fiscal year 1992 were fully
funded, but indicated that this trend may not continue past
fiscal year 1993. Future shortfalls might require greater
time periods between scheduled maintenance availabilities,
deferring more depot level work to Shore Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) and surface repair ships. In
addition, surface repair ships could be required to conduct
more of their own scheduled availability work.
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The possible impact from these changes on surface ship
maintenance and repair requirements overseas could be two-
fold. First, as more work items are deferred, the size of a
supported ship's work package increases with a corresponding
increase in work load on either the deployed tender or shore-
based ship repair facility. The practice of deferring repair
work for budgetary reasons may also increase the freguency of
emergent repairs. If the downward trend in surface repair
ship availability continues past 1995, demand on overseas
shore-based maintenance facilities to provide the necessary
support will increase. This contingency brings into focus the
second issue.
Section 7309(c), of Title 10, United States Code,
prohibits ships homeported in the United States from being
overhauled, repaired, or maintained overseas except for voyage
repairs. Interviewees from Ship Repair Unit, Naples, Italy,
and Naval Sea Systems Command Management Office, Western
Pacific Area, Pearl harbor, Hawaii, indicated that
interpretation of the law may also include all scheduled
repairs of ships homeported in the United States, rendering
the term voyage repairs synonymous with emergent repairs.
Based on this interpretation, the need for employing surface
repair tenders overseas could become crucial if material
readiness of deployed forces is to be maintained in remote
areas.
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C. SHIP MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR CONTRACTING OVERSEAS
All commercial ship repair contracts in the Mediterranean
theater are awarded and administered through the Ship Repair
Division, Naval Regional Contracting Center, Naples, Italy.
A Master Ship Repair and Alteration agreement is the basic
contractual instrument used in the provision of commercial
ship repair work.
1. Master Ship Repair and Alteration Contracts
The Master Ship Repair and Alteration (MSRA) contract
is an agreement between the United States Government and a
commercial contractor certified to perform ship repair work on
Navy ships. The purpose of a MSRA is to establish, in
advance, the terms and conditions under which the contractor
will perform (Basic Ordering Agreement). The use of MSRA
procedures expedites subsequent awards of Job Orders for
actual repair work, reduces administrative efforts and costs,
and provides contractors the opportunity to bid on and perform
repair work under uniform and consistent terms and conditions.
A MSRA is not a guarantee of work, an entitlement to future
awards, or a certification of the contractor's ability to
perform every repair job. In addition, a MSRA related Job
Order cannot be utilized to purchase material or work that is
not a part of the Ship Alteration and Repair Package (SARP).
[Ref. 17]
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A commercial contractor, wishing to obtain an MSRA
contract, submits a request for award to Naval Regional
Contracting Center Naples, Italy. The administrative
contracting officer (ACO) determines whether to award or deny
the request based on results of a pre-award survey conducted
at the prospective contractor's facilities. Upon award, the
MSRA is revised periodically to incorporate any changes in
statutes or procurement regulations. To compensate for
changes in international monetary markets, contract line item
(CLIN) pricing is adjusted on all MSRAs prior to the beginning
of each fiscal year and remains fixed throughout the 12 month
period. An MSRA is not transferable. If a contractor's repair
facility is sold or ownership changes, the agreement is
cancelled. [Ref. 17]
2 . Current Contracting Procedures
As noted previously in Chapter III, final preparations
of depot level maintenance periods (RAVs) are accomplished
immediately following arrival of the supported unit for
repairs. Based on the proposed work package, funding
requirements are estimated and justified by ship surveyors.
These estimates ultimately serve as the government estimate to
be used by the contracting officer in evaluating competitive
bids from prospective contractors.
Contractors, possessing valid MSRAs, are invited on
board the ship to ship-check the proposed work package. Each
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contractor submits a formal bid to the cognizant contracting
officer. The bids are evaluated and a firm-fixed-price job
order is awarded to the successful contractor. The contractor
orders any non-government furnished material (unless
constrained by time length of availability) and commences
contract performance. Interviewees at both Naval Regional
Contracting Center and Ship Repair Unit at Naples, Italy,
indicated that final contract preparations are extremely fast-
paced. As a general rule, MSRA purchase orders are awarded
and contract performance begins within 24 to 3 6 hours after
arrival of the supported unit inport.
3 . Contractual Issues and Problems
In November 1992, there were 38 MSRAs administered
through Naval Regional Contracting Center, Naples, Italy. The
Ship Repair Division is authorized one supervisor, four
contract specialists and one clerk typist. Each contract
specialist is limited in contractual authority (warrant) to
$50 thousand. One contracts representative is reguired to be
on-site or on-call at each port during contract performance.
Based on organizational strength, a maximum of four different
ports can be covered at one time. Based on an interview with
the Supervisor of the Ship Repair Division, the current
organization is large enough to support current demand of
approximately 40 restricted availabilities per year. When
demand increases, such as during Operation Desert Storm,
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contracts personnel were "borrowed" from other divisions at
the contracting center at Naples, Italy, to administer the
additional requirements.
Interviewees at both Naval Regional Contracting Center
and Ship Repair Unit, Naples, Italy, admitted the possibility
of contractor buy-ins (the practice of a contractor submitting
a bid known to be below their costs just to get the contract,
with the intent of adding "full cost" work later) but
indicated that any cost incurred, as a result of this
practice, would be minimal. Costs incurred from growth work
after contractor performance begins is limited due to time
constraints of the maintenance availability. Additional work
that cannot be conducted during the same maintenance
availability period is deferred (ship mission permitting) to
the next availability. The work is ultimately included in a
new job order which is competitively awarded. This restricts
the incentive for a contractor to buy-in and try to get-well
later. In addition, the practice of buy-ins would be
primarily limited to the Naples, Italy, region which
encompasses seven of the 38 MSRA contractors. Repair ship
competition at other regions in the Mediterranean is more
limited, with some areas supported by sole-source contractors.
The Supervisor, Ship Repair Division, also indicated
that a primary problem leading to higher repair costs stems
from cultural differences between the various MSRA contractors
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and the United States Navy. The standard Israeli work week
starts on Sunday and ends on Thursday. The standard Islamic
work week starts on Saturday and ends on Wednesday. As an
example, if a Navy ship arrives at the shipyard at Haifa,
Israel to conduct repairs on a Friday or Saturday, overtime
must be paid. An added premium is required for holidays. As
the interviewee noted, "The Navy is notorious for scheduling
ships inport on a Friday to conduct repairs over the weekend,
then back out to sea on Monday morning. " This practice
provides additional support to the issue that operational
commanders make decisions that impact on maintenance costs,
but are not held accountable for the additional costs
incurred.
D. ASSESSMENT OF OVERSEAS SURFACE SHIP MAINTENANCE COSTS
1. Mobile Maintenance Platforms
Elements of surface tender maintenance costs fall into
two categories: materials used to complete repair jobs and the
inherent costs (fixed costs) of operating a mobile surface
platform.
Ship repair tenders procure material with and manage
the expenditure of Repair of Other Vessel (ROV) maintenance
dollars. These mobile platforms also have the capacity to
carry a storehouse of military specification (MIL-SP^C)
materials for fabrication and high usage repair parts (Tender
Load List) on board. Excluding the fixed costs of operating
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a tender, maintenance repair jobs are essentially accomplished
at a visible cost of material only, which is supported by Type
Commander ROV funds.
As previously noted in Chapter III, the current
agreement between CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCLANTFLT provides for 14
uninterrupted days for an IMAV overseas. Availabilities
conducted in CONUS encompass 21 days for both tender and SIMA
shore based IMAVs. A comparison in material expenditure and
productivity between IMAVs conducted in CONUS and those
performed by surface tenders deployed in the Mediterranean
theater is shown in Table 3 [Ref.15].
























21 days $ 35K 325 15.5 $107.69
SIMA
( CONUS
21 days $ 110K 350 16.6 $314.28
1ROV material requirements for completed jobs
2Average number of work package items started and completed
3Average daily production rate and ROV material cost per job
The average surface tender material cost averages
approximately $108 per job during a 21 day cumulative tending
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day CONUS IMAV. The average SIMA material cost averages
approximately $314 per job for a 21 cumulative tending day
CONUS IMAV. The average material cost averages $77 per job
for a deployed surface tender during a shorter 14 day
availability period.
The lower cost and higher productivity rate
experienced by deployed tenders is primarily attributed to the
environment in which repairs are conducted. As previously
addressed in Chapter III, ship checking the scheduled IMAV
work package may not be feasible prior to arrival of the
supported unit alongside the tender. Day one of the scheduled
14 day availability period starts immediately upon arrival of
the supported unit. At the same time, tender repair personnel
complete any remaining ship checks and verify actual eguipment
conditions. Growth work is assessed, material reguirements
are identified, and repair work commences on as many jobs as
possible. Based on a 14 day availability constraint,
procurement of non-available materials reguires short lead-
times. The 14 day time constraint ultimately minimizes
overall material costs by restricting procurement to materials
actually utilized in performance of maintenance and repair
work during a respective maintenance availability period.
Productivity throughout the deployed maintenance
availability remains high. Individual work items are signed
off upon completion by the respective tender repair personnel
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responsible. The sign off procedure documents accountability
of work and provides the tended unit's commanding officer a
certain measure of quality on repair work performed. Deployed
tender personnel are highly trained, representing a captive
and highly innovative work force. In a deployed environment,
tender repair personnel thrive on self-sufficiency [Ref. 15].
The prevention of long lead-time procurement may cause
some repairs, involving unique or complex material
requirements, to be deferred. Procurement of unique materials
also involves higher costs which, at times, include material
requirements for support of higher and more complex (depot)
level repairs. Repair item complexity is a contributing
factor of higher material costs for CONUS based repairs as
shown in Table 3. CONUS based IMAVs entail 21 vice 14 day
availability periods and are geographically closer to material
sources.
2. Shore Based Industrial Facilities
Elements of Ship Repair Unit (SRU) maintenance costs
include government furnished material (GFM) and contractor
furnished material (CFM), SRU and Naval Regional Contracting
Center overhead expenses, contractor labor manhour rates, and




Experience has shown that foreign commercial
contractors will stock United States Military Specification
(MIL-SPEC) material if deemed profitable by the contractor
based on historical demand, and if the contract includes a
provision requiring the Government to finance the purchase.
Commercial contractors located in Naples, Italy and Haifa,
Israel are currently contracted to carry a limited amount of
United States MIL-SPEC material.
As previously noted in Chapter III, commercial
contractors are restricted to major non-nuclear and
unclassified Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) work.
Foreign contractor furnished material is common to commercial
ship type requirements. Supported Navy units generally
provide most MIL-SPEC material and carry unique ship's system
repair parts on board.
b. Labor Overhead Expense
Ship Repair Unit, Naples, Italy, was established
with authorized staff positions to support an estimated 40
restricted availabilities (RAVs) per year. Salary and
overtime expense of SRU surveyor, comptroller, and MUSE
engineer personnel are paid for by CINCUSNAVEUR Operating
Budget. Surveyor and MUSE engineer travel expenses are
supported by CINCLANTFLT TYCOM RATA funds.
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Civil service surveyors for conducting surface
ship repairs are required on-site at respective foreign
commercial facilities. For reasons of safety, contractual,
and quality assurance considerations, surveyors remain on call
during all hours of actual contractor performance, within the
first nine months of fiscal year 1992, SRU surveyors completed
over 40 RAVs [Ref. 15]. Personnel expenses of NRCC Ship
Repair Division includes salary, overtime, and travel, and are
funded by Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). One contract
specialist is required to be on-site and on-call during every
major RAV.
c. Labor Manhour Rates
Average labor manhour rates of foreign commercial
contractors located in the Mediterranean theater are shown in
Table 4 [Ref. 15]. For purposes of comparison, labor manhour
rates of CONUS based Tiger Teams and deployed surface tenders
are also shown [Ref. 15]. Manhour rates are based on the
assumption that maintenance manhours required to accomplish
the same job are identical for all repair activities. This
assumption is unrealistic, but creates a common standard for
computation of normative rates.
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TABLE 4: LABOR MANHOUR RATES




1 . Bahrain $ 11.34
2 . Egypt $ 12.00
3 . Turkey $ 14.00
4. United Arab Emirates $ 14.50
5 . Spain $ 20.83
6. USN Tender $ 22.60
7. Gibraltar $ 23.10
8 . Portugal $ 23.10
9. Greece $ 23.85
10. Israel $ 28.86
11. France $ 30.17
12. Italy, Naples $ 32.99
13. Italy, All Other $ 43.20
14. CONUS Tiger Team $ 50.00
Dollar fluctuation in international monetary
markets does not effect manhour costs directly. Manhour rates
are budgeted and fixed at the beginning of each fiscal year,
and represents the rate charged to respective CINCLANTFLT and
CINCPACFLT RATA accounts.
The surface tender manhour rate is based on both
production and overhead personnel of an average sized surface
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tender repair department. The manhour rate includes base
salary and benefits, and is based on a 40 hour work week.
Tender repair department personnel routinely work in excess of
a 40 hour week without overtime or other premium time
considerations
.
The CONUS Tiger Team manhour rate is based on
normative shipyard manday rates and overhead, but does not
include required PERDIEM or transportation costs. These
expenses, in conjunction with a high manhour rate, are
indicative of the high costs incurred when Fly-Away-Teams are
deployed from CONUS.
d. Mobile Utility Support Equipment
Ship Repair Unit, Naples, Italy, maintains a fleet
of Mobile Utility Support Equipment (MUSE) capable of
providing certified steam and regulated electrical power to
supported units. MUSE capability enables ships to go cold
iron for conducting engineering plant repairs inport. In
fiscal year 1991, COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT expended $9.8 million on
a combination of government owned MUSE, long-term lease MUSE
(Bahrain), and commercial MUSE Spot Purchases [Ref. 15].
MUSE shore services also can be used to conserve
fuel. A steam ship inport operating the engineering plant
under auxiliary steaming or modified main uses substantially
more fuel than shore MUSE support. Based on notational burn
rates, gas turbines and diesel ships also use more fuel inport
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than shore based MUSE support. Surface tenders can provide
steam and electrical support: but are limited to the number of
ships that can be supported at one time.
Commercial spot purchase MUSE uses commercial fuel
to avoid damage claims against the Government by the
contractor based on contaminated fuel. Commercial fuel is
funded by CINCLANTFLT allotment and is substantially more
expensive than Navy tax-free fuel. Based on current usage,
the nominal cost differential for use of commercial fuel ($4-
5/gal) vice Navy tax-free fuel ($0.68/gal) equates to
approximately $18,000 per day. Government owned MUSE use tax-
free fuel. [Ref. 15]
MUSE transportation and related travel charges
vary by port location and are fixed at the beginning of each
fiscal year. These costs do not apply to spot purchase MUSE.
Because of contractor buy-ins, trip costs are higher at ports
most frequented by Navy ships. [Ref. 15]
3 . Eliminating Repair Ship Capability
Overseas maintenance managers have two basic
industrial bases to draw from: shore based industrial bases
and mobile maintenance platforms. As previously addressed in
subsection B.l. of this chapter, the number of commissioned
repair ships continues to decrease and the extent to which
this trend will continue remains unknown. Based on the
premise that repair ships are eliminated, this subsection
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assesses the impact on surface ship maintenance and repair
operations in the Mediterranean theater.
a. Restricted Availability Requirements
Conducting RAVs at shore based facilities on all
deployed surface ships at the current fiscal year 1992 level
and utilizing alternative Fly-Away-Teams ( FATs ) could
potentially increase CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT RATA funding
requirements from the current $30 million to approximately $90
million annually.
The average deployed surface tender completes
between 1000 and 1200 repair jobs every two weeks [Ref. 15].
Based on an average completion rate of 325 jobs per supported
unit (TABLE 4), surface tenders currently provide an
equivalent of 3.4 IMAVs every two weeks or approximately 88
maintenance availabilities per year.
Current annual RATA expenditures to support 40
RAVs is approximately $25 million [Ref. 15]. An additional 88
RAVs, representing a requirement increase of 220%, creates a
potential net increase of approximately $55 million in annual
RATA funding requirements.
The average surface tender also corrects over 300
surface ship CASREPS per deployment and fields over 100 FATSs
[Ref. 15]. Elimination of surface tender capability would
result in the combined use of CONUS technicians, Naval
Shipyard Tiger Teams and possible deferral of repairs to
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foreign commercial technicians. The alternative use of these
sources is estimated to require an additional funding increase
between $2 million and $4 million annually, depending upon
CASREP frequency and severity.
b. Ship Repair Unit Structure
In addition to RATA expenditures, a 220% increase
in RAVs could potentially create a substantial increase in
the current $2 million CINCUSNAVEUR Operating Budget [Ref.
15]. COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT Ship Repair Unit located in Naples,
Italy, would require relocation to facilitate increased space
requirements. The added demand in RAV and CASREP assistance
would create a corresponding increase in ship's surveyor, HM&E
technician, combat system technician, and administrative
personnel requirements. The requirement for NRCC ship repair
contract administrators is estimated to increase from four to
ten contract specialists. Under the current SRU
organizational structure, the majority of additional personnel
requirements would be staffed with civil servants, creating
proportionate increases in overtime, PERDIEM, and travel
expenses.
The CINCLANTFLT open ended MUSE allotment would
also increase from the current $10 million expenditure level.
To support an additional 88 RAVs, an increase in contractor




Surface ship tenders provide the overseas
maintenance manager a flexible and mobile maintenance
capability to support deployed units in remote geographic
locations. Shore based maintenance facilities cannot
inherently provide this capability. Dependence on technical
expertise and material from CONUS, or contracting from foreign
sources, will cause critical delays in responding to ship
CASREPS
.
Without a mobile warehouse of stocked materials
and repair parts to draw from (Tender Load List), additional
delays will be incurred acquiring critical materials. This
also may require additional expenditures for procurement and
pre-positioning of repair equipment material at remote
locations.
The provision of logistical flight support in the
Mediterranean theater is a joint responsibility, shared
between Air Force and Naval Air components. Logistic
connectivity and dependability of flight services between
remote geographical locations will be crucial for transport of
both material and technical personnel.
E. ALTERNATIVE RESOURCE REQUIREMENT CONCEPTS
Section B of this chapter addressed current funding trends
and resource requirement trends confronting surface ship
maintenance managers overseas. This section addresses two
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alternative concepts for providing mobile ship repair
capability overseas.
1. Mobile Ship Repair Facilities
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, is
developing a prototype Mobile Repair Ship Facility (MSRF)
capable of providing a full range of intermediate maintenance
level repairs as well as capabilities for various depot level
repairs [Ref . 18 ]
.
The MSRF will utilize assets taken from Ship Repair
Facility, Subic Bay, Philippines, and will be comprised of a
self-docking floating dry dock with 17,200 tons lifting
capacity, repair barges, berthing barge, power barge with
floating crane, and pusher boats. The facility, which can be
deployed with or without the dry dock, will be manned by nine
military personnel, six senior supervisory civil service
personnel, and a crew of approximately 350 foreign contractor
personnel. When required, intermediate or depot maintenance
level Tiger Teams could also augment the MSRF work force.
[Ref. 18]
An estimated 12 months will be required to develop the
MSRF project. As of November 1992, interviewees at CINCPACFLT
indicated that the MSRF project had still not been funded.
Also, the requirement to contract a crew by a foreign
contractor may be prohibited under Section(c) of Title 10,
United States Code.
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2 . Universal Repair Ship Concepts
The universal repair ship concept is based on
combining the capabilities of a surface repair tender and a
submarine repair tender. The concept is not new, and has been
successful in the past.
In January 1991, USS MCKEE (AS 41), homeported in San
Diego, California, deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of
Operation Dessert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Pre-
deployment preparations reguired a revised Tender Load List
(6000 additional line items), technical documentation, and
repair eguipment reguired to support surface ship classes.
Within the first 30 days after arriving on station in the
Persian Gulf, USS MCKEE completed 13 technical availabilities
and over 1,300 individual surface ship repair jobs. Based on
the success of MCKEE, the universal concept has proven to be
a viable alternative under demanding conditions. [Ref. 19]
F. SUMMARY
1. Trends in Surface Ship Maintenance Requirements
The number of surface repair ships available for
employment will continue to decrease. It is highly probable
that only six surface ship tenders will remain in service by
1995, and it is possible that there will be fewer than this
number. There is no plan, nor are the resources available, to
replace the aging fleet of surface ship tenders through new
construction.
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The overseas maintenance manager has two basic ship
maintenance repair sources to draw from: shore-based
commercial facilities and deployed repair ships. Based n
current trends, continued employment of repair ships overseas
may be in jeopardy. Pursuant to Section 7309(c), of Title 10,
United States Code, repairs at overseas commercial facilities
may be restricted to emergent mission essential repairs only.
The overseas maintenance manager will ultimately have no other
alternative to draw from, and material readiness of the
deployed fleet could suffer as a result.
2 . Ship Maintenance and Repair Contracting Overseas
The Master Ship Repair and Alteration agreement (MSRA)
is the basic contractual tool used in providing commercial
ship repair and maintenance overseas. An MSRA does not
include a guarantee of work. Based on the MSRA, actual
contract work is competitively awarded through individual job
orders.
The possibility of contractor buy-ins does exist,
particularity in the competitive market surrounding Naples,
Italy, but was not considered by the interviewees to represent
a significant problem. Because of timing constraints, work
package growth during a specific maintenance availability is
limited. Work deferred to another availability is
competitively awarded under new job orders.
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A primary cause of unexpected increases in maintenance
and repair costs is the practice of scheduling ships inport
for repairs during weekends or holidays. The problem applies
to all ports and respective MSRA contractors located
throughout the Mediterranean region, but is more acute in
ports where the customary work week and religious holidays
differ from American custom. As noted, operational commanders
traditionally schedule deployed units for port calls on
weekends, increasing overtime and other premium costs, but are
not held accountable for these incremental costs.
3. Overseas Surface Ship Repair Costs
Deployed surface ship tenders incur lower material
costs and provide support at higher productivity rates than
other tenders and Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities
based in CONUS . A job item sign-off procedure documents
repair accountability and provides the supported unit
commanding officer a certain measure of guality on repair work
performed.
Average labor man-hour rates vary considerably between
regional MSRA contractor locations in the Mediterranean
theater. The average man-hour rate for CONUS Tiger Teams
represents the highest rate, excluding PERDIEM and
transportation costs to and from CONUS. In the absence of any
repair ship capability, annual RATA funding requirements could
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potentially increase by 200 percent, based on fiscal year 1992
requirement levels.
Surface ship tenders provide a flexible and mobile
maintenance capability to support deployed units in remote
operational areas. Surface ship maintenance and repair
facilities based on shore cannot provide this capability.
4. Alternative Resource Concepts
The long-term Naval presence in the Persian Gulf,
coupled with the current Navy-wide repair ship shortage and
loss of the Ship Repair Facility in Subic Bay, requires an
alternative ship repair facility. The Mobile Ship Repair
Facility concept encompasses Navy owned assets which are
currently not being utilized, but could be used to provide a
range of intermediate and depot level maintenance support in
remote areas.
The universal repair ship concept provides a common
repair ship platform to support both surface and submarine
class ships. The concept is not new and proved to be an
effective alternative for ships deployed in the Persian Gulf.
The final chapter answers the research questions




A. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Research Question 1
What are the critical requirements and funding issues
confronting maintenance resource facilities overseas?
The answer to the first research question regarding
critical overseas requirements and funding was assessed in
Chapters III and IV. The most critical issue confronting
surface ship maintenance and repair capability overseas is the
continued reduction and potential elimination of mobile repair
platforms (tenders).
The decline in surface repair ship availability cannot
continue at the current rate without severely effecting the
high level material readiness requirement of a forward
deployed fleet. Forward presence and crisis response are
fundamental to a national military strategy that is regionally
orientated [Ref. 10]. Surface ship maintenance and repair
operations, conducted in support of Operation Desert Shield
and Operation Desert Storm, provide clear evidence that mobile
maintenance platforms are required to support deployed units
in remote geographical locations during periods of regional
crisis. Shore-based ship repair facilities, whether civilian
or military, cannot inherently provide this capability.
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The second most critical issue is the constraints
placed on overseas shore-based maintenance and repair
facilities. First, foreign commercial contractors are
restricted primarily to non-nuclear and unclassified Hull,
Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) repair work. Second,
Section 7309(c) of Title 10, United States Code, prohibits
ships homeported in the United States from being overhauled,
repaired, or maintained overseas except for voyage repairs.
Overseas shore-based maintenance capability is constrained not
only as to the type of repair (HM&E) but, to the timing of the
repair (scheduled vice unscheduled) as well. The timing
constraint is externally imposed without regard to actual
material condition.
2 . Research Question 2
What effect will new Navy maintenance strategies have
on planned reguirements assigned to maintenance facilities
overseas?
The Phased Maintenance Concept, Progressive
Maintenance Concept, and Engineered Operating Cycle Programs
were developed to support major class maintenance plans.
There is no evidence to indicate that these initiatives will
have any effect on ship maintenance and repair facilities
overseas.
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3 . Research Question 3
Can Maintenance Requirement System (MRS) principles be
applied during periods of deployment to improve material
combat readiness?
The successful application of Maintenance Requirement
System principles in the fleet will depend on the
developmental progress of three separate programs: Assessment
of Equipment Condition, Measures of Effectiveness, and
Maintenance Requirements System.
The process of defining maintenance requirements is
the foundation upon which the Maintenance Requirement System
is based. Maintenance requirements are defined by the
availability planning process. The Assessment of Equipment
Condition program integrates condition based requirements in
the work definition process. Data from the work definition
process is then used to update the availability planning
process. The Measures of Effectiveness program provides the
tool for assessing the progress of both the Assessment of
Equipment Condition and Maintenance Requirement System
programs [Ref. 19].
If successful, these programs should provide shipboard
personnel with the necessary diagnostic tools and techniques
that will enhance condition based decision-making, resulting
in a more cost effective management of risk.
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4. Research Question 4
How can the concept of conditional based maintenance
be reinforced through the use of mobile maintenance platforms
such as tender repair ships?
Statistical evidence, based on CASREP studies,
indicates that the more a ship steams and the longer it stays
out of port, the greater the probability for a systems
failure. On the other hand, higher levels of manning and a
lower percentage of crew turnover improves a ship's material
condition. In addition, the longer a commanding officer has
had command of a ship, the fewer new CASREPS it will have.
[Ref. 20]
This evidence supports the concept of condition based
maintenance and the associated management of risk by the
decision-maker. Because of lower turnover rates, trained and
experienced ship crews are retained on board who are more
knowledgeable with ship systems and actual material
conditions. The decision-maker (commanding officer) is better
able to manage risk because of a higher level of confidence in
crew self-sufficiency. Surface ship tenders can be utilized
to enhance this self-sufficiency by providing higher level
technical training, and by involving ship crews (joint effort)
in the conduct of scheduled or emergent ship repairs.
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5 . Other Observations
This thesis has identified critical requirement
concepts and funding issues for maintaining material readiness
of deployed forces. Of all the evidence gathered in
conducting research for this thesis, the most serious
observations relate to two critical issues concerning surface
ship maintenance and repair capability. As identified in
Chapter III and discussed in Chapter IV, the overseas
maintenance manager has two basic ship maintenance activity
sources to provide support in theater: shore-based commercial
facilities and deployed repair ships. The number of surface
repair ships available for employment overseas continues to
decrease, while foreign shore-based commercial facilities are
continually more constrained to voyage repairs. The
overwhelming consensus, based on interviews conducted during
research, is that the severity of this problem will continue
or increase.
Navy repair ships are, and will continue to be, a
scarce resource. Surface tenders have proven to be
strategically crucial in maintaining a deployed naval force
during times of regional crisis. Homeporting a surface tender
overseas places the scarce resource where it can be utilized
most effectively, maintaining material readiness of a deployed
fleet.
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As discussed in Chapter IV, congressional legislation
under Section 7309(c), of Title 10, United States Code, places
a larger dependency on deployed surface ships to provide
maintenance support other than voyage repairs. With the
absence of CONUS based surface tenders, demand at CONUS Shore
Intermediate Maintenance Activities should increase. In
effect, this could create common ground for a compromise
between proponents of the Title 10, United States Code, and
the Navy over the requirement to maintain material readiness
of a deployed fleet. If successful, such agreement could also
serve as the initial justification base for eventual
replacement of an aging repair ship fleet which is the longer-
term solution.
Finally, the Maintenance Repair Ship Facility concept,
addressed in Chapter IV, provides evidence that the Navy owns
ship maintenance resources that are not effectively utilized.
If a surface repair ship were homeported overseas with assets
such as floating cranes and floating drydocks, the Navy could
acquire the inherent capability to conduct higher industrial
level repairs thus reducing the dependency on foreign
commercial contract requirements.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas are suggested for further research:
1. The feasibility for permanent deployment of surface
repair ships (tenders) overseas. What would be the
principal problems associated with homeporting all
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available surface repair platforms overseas? What
would be the impact on Shore Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) in CONUS? What
additional resources would be required to support
depot level maintenance repairs and are these
resources currently available in Navy owned
inventory? (Feasibility Assessment)
The Universal Repair Ship. What is the feasibility
of consolidating available surface and sub-surface
auxiliary repair ship assets (AD & AS) into a common
repair ship platform? What basic changes in the
ships configuration, loading, and manpower
requirements would be required? How could a
universal platform be employed to support both
surface and sub-surface units? What effects would a
universal repair ship have on material readiness of
a deployed fleet? (Feasibility Assessment)
Maintenance Requirements System. Can Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA) level maintenance data be
linked to the Maintenance Requirements System (MRS)
data development process? How can MRS be integrated
at shore and afloat IMA facilities? What would be
the hardware configuration requirements and
feasibility for standardization? (Technical
Feasibility Study)
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS
ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
AEC Assessment of Equipment Condition
CASREP Casualty Report
CFM Contractor Furnished Material
CLIN Contract Line Item Number
CMP Class Maintenance Plan
CNO Chief Naval Operations
CONUS Continental United States
EOC Engineered Operating Cycle
FAT Fly-Away-Team
GFM Government Furnished Material
HM&E Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical
IMAV Intermediate Maintenance Availability
MARG Marine Amphibious Readiness Group
MDS Maintenance Data System
MIL-SPEC Military Specification
MOE Measures of Effectiveness
MOTU Mobile Technical Unit
MRMS Maintenance Resource Management System
MRS Maintenance Requirement System
MSRA Master Ship Repair Agreement
MSRF Mobile Ship Repair Facility
MUSE Mobile Utility Support Equipment
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MWP Mediterranean Work Package
NAVSSES Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station
NRCC Naval Regional Contracting Center
OPTAR Operating Budget
O&S Operating and Support
PERA Planning and Engineering or Repairs and
Alterations
PMA Phased Maintenance Availability
PMP Phased Maintenance Program
PMS Preventive Maintenance System
PMT Performance Monitoring Team
PROG Progressive Maintenance Concept
RATA Restricted Availability - Technical Availability
RAV Restricted Availability
ROV Repair of Other Vessel
SARP Ship Alteration and Repair Package
SIMA Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
SMART Ship Machinery analysis and Research Technigue
SRA Selected Restricted Availability
SRF Ship Repair Facility
SRU Ship Repair Unit
SWLIN Ship Work Line Item Number
SWAB Ship Work Authorization Boundary
TLL Tender Load List
TYCOM Type Commander
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